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Abstract 
This paper analyses the conditions under which a group of firms is incentivised to 
sign a voluntary agreement (VA) to control polluting emissions even in the presence 
of free-riding by other firms in the industry. We consider a policy framework in 
which firms in a given industry decide whether or not to sign a VA proposed by an 
environmental regulator. We identify the features that a VA should possess in order 
to incentivize firms to participate in the VA and to enhance its economic and 
environmental effectiveness. Under very general conditions on the shape of the 
demand schedule, we obtain the following results. First, a VA does not belong to the 
equilibrium of the coalition game when benefits from voluntary emission abatement 
are a pure public good. Second, in the presence of partial spillovers – i.e. when 
signatories obtain more benefits from the VA than non-signatories – a VA belongs 
to the equilibrium only if a minimum participation rule is guaranteed. Third, a VA 
with a minimum participation rule and a minimum mandatory emission abatement 
may improve welfare (and even industry profits) compared to a VA in which firms 
are free to set their own profit maximising abatement level. 
 
Keywords: Voluntary agreement, voluntary approaches, new policy instruments, 
environmental regulation, coalition structures, emission standards. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, traditional environmental policy based on 
command-and-control regulation or on price incentives (i.e. 
environmental taxes and subsidies) has been challenged by the increasing 
popularity of various forms of voluntary commitments by firms to 
improve their environmental performance beyond what is required by 
the law. The terms “voluntary approaches” and “voluntary agreements” 
(henceforth VAs) are the most common labels attached to this kind of 
environmental policy instruments.1  
Given the documented increased use of VAs in addressing 
domestic and international environmental problems (e.g. OECD, 2003), 
several authors have analysed their main pros and cons.2 On the one 
hand, VAs’ flexibility and potential to stimulate innovation and the 
diffusion of cleaner technologies has been emphasized. On the other, 
concerns have been expressed about VAs’ real effectiveness and possible 
misuse as a tool for regulatory capture. 
When studying the economic functioning of VAs, the first 
question that arises is “why do profit maximising firms decide to adhere 
to a VA? By and large, the answer falls into two main categories (Brau 
and Carraro, 2006): (i) VAs can increase market demand, and therefore 
profits, mainly by enhancing a firm’s green reputation. (ii) VAs can be 
used to achieve cost advantages, which may take the form of avoiding the 
costs of public regulation designed to address the environmental 
problem, or technical and financial incentives granted by regulators, or 
advantages from information and innovation sharing among signatory 
firms. Specific explanations and institutional arrangements for all forms 
of VAs have been widely studied in the recent environmental economics 
                                                 
1 According to a well established classification (e.g. OECD, 1999; Carraro and 
Lévêque, 1999), the term voluntary approaches, refers to unilateral commitments, 
which consist of environmental improvement programs established by polluters 
themselves and communicated to their stakeholders; public voluntary programs, in 
which participating firms agree to frameworks and standards developed by 
public authorities; negotiated agreements, which are contracts between public 
authorities and industry. The term voluntary agreements should mainly be used for 
the latter two categories, but is often used to encompass all forms of voluntary 
commitments by firms (e.g. Glachant, 2007).  
2 See the surveys by Alberini and Segerson (2002), Lyon and Maxwell (2002), 
Khanna, 2001, and the books edited by Carraro and Lévêque (1999) and 
Baranzini and Thalman (2004). More recent references to empirical analyses are 
reported in Uchida and Ferraro (2007). 
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literature (e.g., for public voluntary programs, see Wu and Babcock, 
1999; Lyon and Maxwell, 2003; Glachant, 2007; for negotiated 
agreements, Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Manzini and Mariotti, 2003; for 
unilateral commitments, Bagnoli and Watts, 2003; Lutz, Lyon and 
Maxwell, 2000).  
Most of these articles restrict their analysis to the bargaining 
process between an industry representative (or monopolist) and a public 
regulatory body, or to the strategic interactions among firms which offer 
environmentally differentiated products. A less researched area has 
focused on the interactions between firms that negotiate a VA with the 
environmental regulator. In this setting, it is important to take into 
account the fact that the benefits firms gain by adhering to a VA often 
exhibit some degree of non rivalry and non excludability, i.e. once signed 
and implemented, the VA yields positive spillovers to non signatories 
(e.g. see Dixit-Olson (2000), Xepapadeas-Passa (2004) and Segerson-
Dawson (2008) for models with homogeneous firms; Lutz et al., 2000 
with heterogeneous firms). Interactions among firms are very important 
for the design of a VA, given that a problem of free-riding is likely to 
arise. 
This paper focuses on VAs between several firms and an 
environmental regulator and analyses whether firms in a given industry 
are actually incentivised to sign a VA when the benefits derived from the 
agreement may be enjoyed not only by the signatory firms, but may also 
spill over to others. For example, increased market demand resulting 
from a green marketing strategy that publicises the adoption of a new 
environmentally-friendly production process, may benefit all firms in the 
industry, rather than just those using the new process. Alternatively, if a 
group of firms can prevent implementation of a cost-ineffective 
regulation by undertaking a VA, all firms in the industry will benefit 
therefrom, not only those that sign the VA. A share of these benefits can 
be exclusive (depending on the type of marketing strategy or regulation); 
but at least some portion of these benefits will be enjoyed by firms that 
do not adhere to the VA. In the light of these considerations, a VA can 
be considered as a public good (although often an ‘impure’ one). A 
firm’s decision whether or not to adopt a VA is therefore strongly 
affected by incentives to free-ride. This situation is widely discussed in 
the public finance and industrial organisation literature, where it is often 
argued that the incentives to free-ride are so strong that no public good 
is actually provided (or no R&D is carried out, or no information is 
collected).  
4 
 
 
In our setting, the incentive to free ride may result in no VA 
being implemented. However, the literature on international 
environmental agreements (IEAs) on global commons has shown that 
even in those cases where a good is purely public, a number of agents – 
in this literature sovereign countries – may decide to pay the cost of 
providing the public good (technically, they form a coalition within 
which the burden of providing the public good is shared).3 If the public 
good is imperfect, then the coalition size usually increases (Yi, 1997, 
2003; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997). It is therefore important to assess 
whether these results also apply to the case of VAs, and above all under 
what conditions a ‘coalitional VA’ emerges, i.e. a group of firms decides 
to sign the VA even if other firms choose to free-ride.  
This kind of analysis has already been performed by Dawson 
and Segerson (2008). They assume that the benefit provided by the VA 
can only be obtained if an industry-wide environmental target – set by 
the regulator – is met. Each firm knows that the VA will be beneficial 
only if a group of firms is committed to achieving the industry’s 
abatement target defined by the regulator. If this is not the case, all firms 
will be penalised. The structure of the VA is such that the regulatory 
body cannot make any differentiation contingent on firms participation 
in the VA, and its signing can therefore be seen as a pure public good. At 
equilibrium, some firms sign the agreement in order to meet the target, 
even if the remaining firms free-ride, and are indifferent between being 
in the coalition or behaving as singletons. 
The approach adopted in this paper is somewhat related to the 
one described above, but enables us to analyse a more general situation. 
We consider a policy scenario where a binding government policy (e.g, a 
carbon tax) is likely to be enforced unless a concerted effort by a 
polluting industry, in terms of costly emission reduction, is made within 
a VA scheme. The latter may foresee signatory-firms specific advantages (e.g. 
in terms of tax reduction, or financial and technical assistance) for 
individual and joint over-compliance, but also imply the industry-wide 
advantage of abolishing (or reducing the likelihood of) the binding 
government policy. Hence, the general case we allow for here has the 
following characteristics: 
First, spillovers are modelled such that VAs which are both pure 
                                                 
3 See the seminal papers by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994); and 
the surveys by Finus (2003), Barrett (2002) and Carraro (2003). 
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or impure public goods can be considered. We model free-riding 
incentives as a continuous function of the voluntary abatement effort 
undertaken by firms, thus allowing for more general cases of self-
regulation. 
Secondly, the costs and benefits that derive from adhering to the 
VA depend not only on the abatement agreement fulfilled by a single 
signatory firm, but also on the abatement levels implemented by the 
other signatories. These benefits accrue as more firms join the coalitional 
VA. This introduces an additional form of interaction amongst firms that 
will be shown to play an important role. 
Third, there is no industry-wide environmental target fixed in 
advance, but the regulator can choose between two different types of 
VA. Namely, one in which firms are free to set their own optimal 
abatement level by maximising profits and minimising regulatory net 
costs, and one in which a minimum abatement level is imposed on each 
firm and a minimum threshold set on the number of firms entering into 
the agreement.  
Within this framework, the features of a coalitional VA are 
investigated in a model without specific functional form assumption on 
market demand. We focus in particular on the conditions under which at 
least some firms adopt the VA. And we devote special attention to the 
policy design implications of the analysis. VAs are often criticised – at 
least in those cases in which they do not foresee an explicit 
environmental target – for being cost-effective but environmentally 
ineffective, because firms within a VA tend to pre-empt regulations or 
access subsidies but achieve poor emission reductions. This paper 
examines this criticism of  VAs and discusses its proper design in terms 
of minimum mandatory requirement (a minimum abatement target or 
other policy measures), and minimum number of participants.  
From a positive viewpoint, we find that VAs do not belong to 
the equilibrium of the coalition game in the case of a pure public good, 
i.e. when spillovers are such that all firms benefit equally from the 
abatement achieved by the signatories, unless an ad hoc assumption is 
made (namely, “coalition unanimity” when the profitability of the VA 
ceases, similarly to Dawson and Segerson’s, 2008). In this sense, one can 
interpret our results as a generalisation of Dawson and Segerson’s 
results. Second, in the case of an ‘impure public good’, namely partial 
spillovers, the VA is not an equilibrium of the coalition game unless the 
regulator imposes a minimum participation constraint for it to come into 
force. In this case, if the minimum participation constraint is met, then 
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strategic interactions induce all firms to sign the VA. Therefore, under 
fairly general conditions, either no firms sign the VA or all firms sign it. 
This is another important difference compared to the literature on IEAs, 
where usually a subset of agents (countries) decides to sign the 
agreement (a partial coalition is formed). 
As for policy design issues, we examine the way in which a 
regulator should design the VA in order to increase both the number of 
signatories and the VA’s economic and environmental effectiveness. In 
addition to the opportunity to discriminate, with specific devices, 
between signatory and non signatory firms, we show that setting a 
minimum threshold on the number of participants for the VA to enter 
into force is an effective instrument for neutralize firms’ incentives to 
free ride. Moreover, we find that a VA with a minimum firm-specific 
mandatory regulation may represent a welfare improving policy vis à vis 
one where firms are free to set their own optimal abatement level, a 
result usually referred only to models of product differentiation (e.g. 
Crampes and Hollander, 1995; for unilateral commitments, see Arora 
and Gangopadyay, 1995; Lutz et al, 2000). More surprisingly, firms’ 
profits may also increase (within a specific parameter interval), since a 
regulation in an oligopolistic setting may induce firms to adopt cartel-like 
production levels (this result is similar to those contained in Dung, 1993; 
Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1996 for taxation; and Farzin, 2003, 
Farzin-Akao, 2006 for quality standards; but has not yet been shown for 
VAs). Finally, “closed membership rules” should be avoided in the VA 
given the presence of incentives for signatory firms to limit the 
maximum number of participants in the agreement. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the main features of the VA model. Section 3 studies the 
equilibrium of the game and identifies the main properties of the 
equilibrium ‘coalitional’ VA. Section 4 discusses the policy implications 
of our analysis and further develops the model by analysing the effects of 
a minimum mandatory abatement target. Finally, the main results of the 
paper are summarised in Section 5, where some directions for further 
research are also outlined. 
2 Regulatory-cost minimising VAs with intra-industry spillovers 
As previously stated, there are several benefits that firms could 
reap by signing an environmental VA. In this paper, we focus on 
benefits arising from the expected reductions of firms’ production costs. 
This includes both absolute cost reductions (due for example to co-
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operation on innovation),4 and relative cost reductions (e.g., due to the 
pre-emption of a regulatory threat. Cf. Segerson-Miceli, 1998).5  
In our analysis we consider the possibility that only a subgroup 
of firms belonging to the industry decides to sign the VA. In this 
particular situation, all or part of the benefits gained by signatory firms 
may spill over to the remaining firms in the industry. Let the share of 
total benefits that spill over to non-signatory firms be denoted by β, with 
β ∈ [0,1]. Full spillovers (i.e. the pure public good case) occur when β = 
1. Otherwise, partial spillovers occur. From a positive perspective, 
allowing for asymmetric benefits (i.e. partial spillovers) is important 
because regulatory authorities do often discriminate between firms 
adhering and those not adhering to voluntary initiatives. This occurs, 
first, when VAs allow participants to access technical or financial 
incentives. Second, and most importantly, when VAs are mainly aimed at 
pre-empting a mandatory threat. In Europe, this is particularly the case 
for some policy mixes, such as the Danish CO2 agreement scheme (see 
Millock and Krarup, 2007) and the British ‘Umbrella Agreements’ (Cf. 
ten Brink, Morère and Wallace-Jones, 2003; de Muizon and Glachant, 
2004). In both cases, public authorities clearly discriminate between 
participants and non participants, by granting the former high reductions 
on CO2 taxations.6  
The benefits from these expected cost reductions are assumed 
to possess two important features. First, benefits increase with 
abatement levels, i.e. the capacity of a VA to offset the implementation 
                                                 
4 This group also comprises VAs with ‘information sharing activities’ (Glachant, 
1999; Cavaliere and Frontoso Silvestri, 2002); innovation oriented’ VAs with 
R&D activities by firms (Aggeri and Hactuel, 1999); VAs with ‘effects on input 
prices’ (e.g. Konar and Cohen, 2001); ‘tailored regulation schemes’ (Boyd and 
Blackman, 2002) and transaction cost reductions (Segerson and Miceli, 1998).  
5 This second group also includes VAs that affect both a legislative threat and 
the attainment of subsidies by a regulator (Lyon and Maxwell, 2003) and VAs 
mainly characterised by a regulator’s subsidy (e.g. Wu and Babcock, 1999), 
which may take the form of technical assistance, beneficial public disclosure or 
financial incentives. 
6 As is well known, energy-intensive firms in Denmark can considerably reduce 
their carbon tax payments by signing a VA with the Danish Energy Agency in 
which they commit to undertake investments for energy efficiency (for an 
evalutation of these policy interventions see Bjørner and Jensen, 2002). In the 
UK, signatories of the Climate Change agreements obtain an 80% reduction of 
the climate change levy. 
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of mandatory regulation (or to gain direct incentives), increases with the 
level of emission abatement effected by each signatory firm. Second, 
benefits are increased by the cooperative behaviour of firms that sign the 
VA and the number of participants. An example of framework 
compatible with these hypotheses is the case studied by Aggeri and 
Hatchuel (1999), where firms adopting a VA agree to common 
technological innovation efforts in order to attain a cleaner production 
goal. Another example is provided by Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 
(2000), who analyse how firms can jointly undertake self-regulatory 
initiatives so as to influence citizens’ demand for mandatory regulation, 
and consequently modify the regulator’s decisions. To account for the 
above features of observed VAs, we assume that firms that sign a VA 
have expected costs lower than those they would face were mandatory 
policy measures applied. Moreover, the cost reduction increases as more 
firms sign the VA and as the abatement effected by these firms increases.  
2.1 The model 
Consider an oligopolistic industry with n identical firms that 
share the same technology and compete à la Cournot. In this framework, 
three externalities can be identified: (i) a Cournot (or ‘combined-profits’) 
externality that leads firms to excess production at the Nash equilibrium 
compared to the case where they behave cooperatively) and choose 
abatement levels without maximising overall industry profits;7 (ii) a VA 
participation externality, through which the benefit achieved by a firm 
increases with the abatement effected by the other signatories;8 (iii) a 
public good externality, which enables a non-signatory firm to receive a 
                                                 
7 From a firm’s perspective, this kind of externality exists in all market structures 
different from cartels, i.e. perfect competition, monopolistic competition and 
Cournot competition. This effect is referred to as ‘combined-profits’ externality 
in the R&D coalition literature (e.g. Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992). 
8 In the case of the policy mixes cited above, as well as in other examples in 
climate change policies (Cf. ten Brink et al., 2003), the very structured nature of 
the schemes apparently seems to eliminate the collective nature of these VAs, 
i.e. each firm is faced with a take-or-leave-it offer -- irrespective of whether or 
not it decides to accept the scheme -- and the nature of the equilibrium seems 
not to be affected by the decisions of other firms. We consider this view as too 
simplistic. Indeed, apart from some public voluntary programs unilaterally 
promoted by regulators, the final written provisions of many VAs are certainly 
influenced by the number of polluters involved in the negotiation and the extent 
of the promised environmental commitments.  
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share β of the benefits produced by implementation of the VAs and the 
related behaviour adopted by the firms which sign the VA.9  
Firms supply a homogeneous good and pollute the environment 
while a regulatory agency proposes a VA to reduce polluting emissions. 
A firm’s decision variables are the production level, the amount of 
emission abatement, and whether or not to sign the VA proposed by the 
regulator. Each firm sets its decision variables by maximising profits.  
The regulator decides the type of VA to propose by taking into 
account the consequent participation incentives and emission levels. His 
objective is the maximisation of social welfare. The regulator we are 
considering is fairly similar to that of Segerson and Miceli (1998), 
Glachant (2007) or Lyon and Maxwell (2003), i.e. a public authority 
which has incomplete control of a mandatory threat of taxation or 
command and control intervention, but which, by promoting the use of 
a VA, is able to eliminate or reduce the severity of such mandatory threat 
and provide firms with technical or financial incentives. A structured 
description in line with our framework is offered by Lyon and Maxwell 
(2003), who model the behaviour of a regulator that prefers a publicly 
subsidised and environmentally weaker VA to the promotion of a 
(uncertain) legislative intervention in cases of strong political 
opposition.10 Note that the preference for the VA may be even more 
likely where real efficiency gains such as those recalled above are 
assumed to take place.11  
The above choices are cast in a three-stage game. In the first 
stage, the regulator chooses between two main types of VAs: (i) a VA in 
                                                 
9 The latter two externalities actually originate from the same economic effect, 
but they differ in size (save for the case of perfect non-excludability). We keep 
them separate in order to better emphasize the role of their different intensity 
and the form of free-riding incentive.  
10 This does not necessarily conflict with the search for social welfare. Be it a 
lesser environmental objective than the mandatory policy, or the granting of 
subsidies, the regulator could simply be evaluating the certainty of the agreed 
voluntary environmental objective at least as the lesser environmental objectives 
or the cost of public funds. 
11 We agree with Lyon and Maxwell (2003) that also allowing for the genuine 
cost advantages related to VAs can make it too easy to reach a conclusion about 
the superiority of VAs. However, the focus is different here. We are not saying 
that VAs are always better. Nevertheless, once the VA option is on the agenda, 
we believe that there is still room for policy design improvement  to make even 
a suboptimal (but feasible) policy better. 
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which signatory firms are free to choose their profit maximising 
abatement level; and (ii) a VA in which each firm is required to attain at 
least a minimum abatement level in order to pre-empt direct regulation.12 
In the second stage, the coalition game takes place. Given the type of 
VA proposed by the regulator, firms decide non-cooperatively whether 
or not to sign it. Each firm chooses its profit maximising strategy by 
taking into account its interaction with the other firms, and the 
implications of the second stage choice for the production and 
abatement decisions that will be taken in the third stage of the game. The 
equilibrium in the second stage is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
and each firm’s strategy space is [to sign the VA, not sign the VA]. 
Decisions are simultaneous and the membership rule is open (see 
Carraro and Marchiori, 2003; Yi, 2003 for a detailed description of these 
assumptions and their implications). In the third stage – the Cournot 
game – the n firms choose their output and optimal abatement levels 
simultaneously and non cooperatively (with or without the constraint on 
minimum abatement levels imposed by the regulator).  
The formal model. Let iy  be firm i’s production level. Total 
output is therefore ∑== ni iyY 1 . The following conditions are needed on 
the demand side in order to ensure stability (Seade, 1980): 
 
(1a)   ( ) ( ) 0''' <− ii yCyP  
(1b)   ( ) ( ) 0''' <+ iii yPyyP , 
 
where ( )iyC  are the overall production costs and ( )iyP  is the inverse 
demand function, which is only assumed to be weakly convex. 
The production activity is polluting and firms may plan to carry 
out some abatement effort ei. Emission abatement is costly. Let us 
assume that firms deciding to sign a VA have an expected convex 
abatement cost equal to ( )ii eφ , where ( ) 00 =′iφ , ( ) 0≥′ ii eφ  for ei>0, and ( ) 0>′′ ii eφ . Also, assume that abatement costs are independent of the 
emission reduction being voluntarily undertaken or in observance of a 
                                                 
12 This is just one of the possible forms of minimum coactive regulation that 
can be introduced in the VA. Another possibility is a minimum environmental 
tax as in the Danish CO2 Agreement Scheme and in the UK “umbrella 
agreements (see footnote 6 above).  
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mandatory requirement. The traditional interpretation is that of an end-
of pipe-technology which absorbs pollutants.13 A complementary 
interpretation, particularly suited to climate change policy agreements, is 
to consider ( )ii eφ  as an emission reduction cost function representing 
the cost from accessing a backstop emission trading market or other 
‘Kyoto mechanisms’. Finally, let ‘A’ indicate an ‘Agreeing’, or VA 
adopting firm, whilst ‘NA’ denotes a ‘Non-Agreeing’ firm.  
The crucial element of the model is the total cost function TC 
(including both production costs ( )iyC  and abatement costs ( )ii eφ ), 
which must be a reduced form of at least three variables: a) the levels of 
emission abatement by participants, b) the number of participants in the 
VA, and c) the spillovers obtained by both ‘agreeing’ and ‘non-agreeing’ 
firms. In order to capture these different effects, we borrow from a kind 
functional form specifications which can often be found in RJV or R&D 
coalition literature (e.g. Katz, 1986; d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; 
Kamien et al, 1992; Suzumura, 1992; Beath, Poyago-Theotoky and Ulph, 
1998) and we assume that the adoption of a VA affects both production 
and abatement costs (the latter in an indirect way, as will appear from 
equilibrium conditions).  
Let c denote the marginal production cost in the business-as-
usual situation (i.e. when no VA is introduced) and let 0eeiA −  be the 
increase in the abatement level agreed by a signatory firm vis-à-vis the 
emission abatement level 0e  achieved when no VA is available to firms.  
Let us also assume that the cost advantages (whether ‘regulatory 
gains’ or real efficiency gains) obtained by a VA signatory are 
proportional to the incremental abatement effort 0eeiA − .  
To allow for cases in which VAs imply significant participation 
costs, let us reduce the previous cost advantage by a share proportional 
to the individual abatement effort. Let d parameterise this possible 
marginal cost increase following the adoption of a VA.  
To model the VA participation externality, let us relate a firm’s 
cost advantage to the number of signatories by means of a positive 
parameter γ.  
Finally, let K∈[1, n] be the number of signatory firms.  
As a consequence, the VA participation externality in a 
                                                 
13 For a recent analysis of the relationship between VAs and the market for 
pollution abatement technologies see David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005). 
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symmetric equilibrium is γ(K-1)( 0eeiA − ), and when all the above 
elements are added up, the expected total cost function of a signatory 
firm is: 
 
(2)  ( ) ( )iAiAiAiA eyzcTC φ++= , 
 
where 
(3)  ( ) ( )∑
=
−−−=
K
k
kkAiiAiA eeeedz
1
00 γ , d < γ 
 
represents the net marginal cost advantages accruing to firm i only once 
it has signed the VA.14 In order to set a limit to the extent of cost 
advantages, we allow for an upper bound eUB, which can conveniently be 
expressed in emission abatement units. This implies that ziA ≥ - eUB. In 
order to ensure positive production levels, we also assume that ziA ≥ - c. 
Without loss of generality and to keep the algebra as simple as possible, 
the value of the parameter γ can be normalised to 1 by introducing a 
parameter δ = d/γ.15 Hence, the expected profit function for firms which 
sign the VA is:16 
 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )iAiAK
k
kkAiiAiA eyeeeecYP φδπ −⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+−= ∑
=1
00
,   δ ∈ [0, 1]. 
 
Recalling that a share β ∈ [0, 1] of the benefits produced by 
adopting the VA spills over onto the non-signatory firms, the latter 
therefore have the following cost function: 
 
                                                 
14 We could add some structure to ziA so as to formally distinguish between 
regulatory gains and genuine efficiency gains. While remarking again that our 
framework may comprise both effects, we prefer not to do so, in order to keep 
the analytical structure as simple as possible. 
15 Note that we are imposing γ ≥ d, and of course this must be true for a 
Cournot-Nash competition framework. Had we allowed for the case in which 
d> γ, no VA could be created unless we assume that firms collude in the choice 
of abatement level.  
16 We usually refer to expected costs and expected profits because the cost 
reduction achieved through the VA is relative to the expected costs under a 
different form of regulation. 
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(5) ( ) ( )0
1
0 iiNA
K
k
kkAiNA eyeecTC φβ +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−= ∑
=
,   β ∈ [0, 1], 
 
where φ(ei0) is the business-as-usual abatement cost, because both 
signatories and non-signatories may effect some abatement effort even in 
the absence of a VA.  
While the abatement cost function is the same regardless of 
whether or not the VA is adopted, non-signatories do not pay the costs 
of implementing the VA, which is ( )0eeA −δ . Thus, their expected profit 
function is: 
 
(6)  ( ) ( ) ( )0
1
0 iiNA
K
k
kkAiNA eyeecYP φβπ −⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−= ∑
≠
. 
 
Finally, let us look at the regulator’s behaviour. As we have said, 
the regulator may set a minimum abatement level ( e ) in order to rule 
out the adoption of ‘cosmetic agreements’. The regulator makes this 
choice in the first stage of the game, by anticipating how the industry will 
behave in the subsequent stages. Hence, the regulator decides to bind the 
firm to an abatement level eiA ≥ e  if its welfare function (defined as 
usual by the sum of industry profits, consumers’ surplus and 
environmental gains), when a minimum binding abatement level is 
imposed, is larger than in those cases where signatory firms are free to 
adopt their profit-maximising abatement strategy. 
 
3 Equilibrium coalitional VAs 
The equilibrium of the game described in the previous section is 
computed by moving backwards from the last stage. Let us first consider 
the case where no VA is proposed (which implies ziA = 0) and compute 
the business-as-usual abatement level ei0. For the sake of simplicity, let us 
also assume that there are no additional demand side or supply side 
effects induced by ei0 – the emission abatement undertaken regardless of 
whether or not a VA is in force.17 Given the existence of a corner 
solution, to compute the equilibrium production and abatement levels 
we use the first order Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which in this case are: 
                                                 
17 Of course, these effects may exist. Here we suppose they are equal to zero in 
order to focus on the effects related to the VA adoption. 
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(7a) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0    and    0    ,0 =−+′≥≤−+′ iiii ycYPyYPycYPyYP , 
(7b) ( ) ( ) 0       and    0                        ,0 =′−≥≤′− iiii eeee φφ , 
 
from which, at equilibrium, 00 =ie , for i = 1,2, … n, because ( ) 0>′ ieφ  
by assumption.18 Hence, when no VA is adopted, the equilibrium output 
coincides with the standard Cournot production level.  
 
When a VA is proposed to firms and the first K firms sign it (K 
= 1, 2, …n), the expected profit functions can then be re-written as: 
 
(8a)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )iAiAK
ik
kAiAiAiA eyeecyYPK φδπ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−= ∑
≠
1   for Ki ,...,1=  
(8b) ( ) ( ) iNAK
k
kAiNAiNA yecyYPK ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= ∑
=1
βπ      for nKi ,....,1+=  
 
If no firms sign the VA, equilibrium profits are those of the 
standard Cournot-Nash competition framework, i.e.  
 
(8c)   ( ) ( )[ ] iNAiNA ycYP −=0π   
 
The differentiation of (8a) and (8b), w.r.t. yiA and eiA respectively 
and w.r.t. yiNA, yields the following first order conditions19 which, jointly 
with the condition UBiA ee ≤ , define the Nash equilibrium values 
( ***  , , iAiNAiA eyy ) of the third stage of the game contingent on K firms 
having signed the VA in the second stage:  
 
                                                 
18 This solution, for condition (7b), is unique given our assumptions on φ(ei), 
and since ziA equals zero when no VA is proposed. Intuitively, in a non-
cooperative framework, firms will abate emissions voluntarily only if this does 
not constitute a net cost for them. The solution could not have been unique had 
we allowed for the presence of other more complicated forms of marginal cost 
effects  arising from voluntary abatement (e.g. end-of-pipe cost modifications). 
19 The solutions to this problem are internal. We do not therefore show the 
weak inequality conditions for this case. 
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(9a)  ( ) ( ) ( ) AA eKcYPyYP −+=+′ δ  
(9b)  ( ) ( )AA ey φδ ′=−1  
(9c)  ( ) ( ) ANA KecYPyYP β−=+′  
 
where δ <1 and ( ) NAA yKnKyY −+= . The index i has been dropped 
given the symmetry of the equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium 
production and abatement level ( ***  , , iAiNAiA eyy ) are a function of K, the 
number of firms that decide to sign the VA. To clarify the notation, here 
and in the sequel we shall write this relationship explicitly.  
 
The equilibrium outputs are obtained by first solving (9b) for Ay : 
 
(10)   ( ) ( )AAA eey 11 −≡−′= ϕδφ  
 
from which ( )AA ye ϕ= . Then, considering the upper bound constraint, 
the equilibrium value *Ay  is: 
 
(11)  ( )*1* AA ey −= ϕ       where    ( ) ( )⎩⎨
⎧=≡ UBAAA e
yye ϕψ min** . 
 
Given that abatement costs are assumed to be convex, the 
abatement level is a monotonically non decreasing function of output.20 
Substituting the expression for Y* and *Ae  in (9a) and (9c) and using 
symmetry again, we obtain: 
 
(12a)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )****** )()( ANAAANAA yKcyKnKyPyyKnKyP ψδ −+=−++−+′  
(12b)  ( ) ( ) ( )****** )()( ANAANANAA yKcyKnKyPyyKnKyP ψβ−=−++−+′ . 
 
Equations (12a) and (12b) implicitly define the equilibrium 
output levels which determine the equilibrium abatement levels. These 
                                                 
20 This result confirms the general applicability of the abatement cost 
specification that we have chosen. 
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equilibrium values (all dependent on K) can then be substituted in the 
profit functions (8a) (8b) to analyse the equilibrium of the second stage 
of the game where firms decide whether or not to sign the VA, i.e. the 
stage where the equilibrium number of signatories, K*, is determined. 
Second stage of the game. 
Let ( ) 0* ≥KiAπ , ( ) 0* ≥KiNAπ  be the values of the profit functions, 
for signatories and non-signatories respectively, when output and 
abatement levels take the equilibrium values determined by eqs. (12a), 
(12b) and (11). A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium 
coalition is that profits for VA signatories are greater than their profits 
when no VA is signed, i.e. 
 
(13)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 00**** ≥−≡Π iNAiAiA KK ππ      for all i=1,2, …K 
 
This profitability (or rationality) condition must hold jointly with 
the so-called stability conditions (Cf. D’Aspremont et al., 1983; Carraro 
and Siniscalco, 1993): 
 
(14a)  ( ) ( )1**** −≥ KK iNAiA ππ ,  for all i = 1, 2, …, n. 
(14b)   ( )1* +KiAπ  ≤ ( )*KiNAπ , for all i = 1, 2, …, n. 
 
The profitability and stability conditions are necessary and 
sufficient to define the Nash equilibrium of the second stage of the 
game. Hence, when players are symmetric, the equilibrium K* is the 
largest admissible integer smaller than the unique root of the following 
equation: 
 
(15)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 01*** =−−≡ KKKL NAA ππ , 
 
where L(K*) is such that L’(K*) < 0, ΠA (K*) ≥ 0 for all K ∈ [1,n], and the 
index i has been dropped because of symmetry.21 
 
Note that, applying (14), if L(K) < 0 for all K ∈ [1, n], then there 
is only a trivial equilibrium coalition, because the incentive to free-ride   
                                                 
21 L(K) is usually referred to as the “stability function” (e.g., Carraro and 
Marchiori, 2003; Hoel and Schneider, 1997). 
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–  ( )1−KNAπ  - ( )KAπ  – is positive for all K ∈ [1,n].  
 
Under the above fairly general functional forms, it is not 
possible to derive an analytical expression for K*. Nonetheless, in the 
following we argue that general conclusions can be drawn. We will show 
that if L(K) > 0 for all K larger than a given value K^, where 1 ≤ K^ < n, 
then the ‘grand coalition’ (K* = n) forms at the equilibrium, provided that 
a coordination mechanism (e.g. a minimum participation constraint) 
guarantees that at least K^ firms join the coalition. 22 We summarise the 
positive results of the model in the following: 
 
Proposition 1 
Under open membership, if benefits for signatories are partially excludable (β <1), 
the stability function L(K) becomes positive for some K ≥ K^ and its slope is positive. 
This implies K* = n, i.e. all firms in the industry decide to sign the VA. If benefits 
for signatories are not excludable (β = 1), no firm adopts the VA. 
 
PROOF. The proof of the proposition can be divided in three main steps 
or lemmas: 
Lemma 1. If β < 1, then there exists a value β
δ
−=
°
1
K  such that, for all 
K ≥ K° (K ≤ n), the output of non-signatories is smaller than signatories;  
Lemma 2. There exist a value K^ ≥ K° for which the stability condition is 
satisfied, and above which it is always positive, so that in equilibrium K* 
= n firms adopt the VA.  
Lemma 3. For β = 1 the stability function L(K*) is negative and negatively 
sloped, so that in equilibrium no stable agreement will be signed by any 
firm. 
                                                 
22 The presence of minimum participation constraint is very common in 
international environmental treaties. According to Rutz (2001), only 2 out of the 
122 multilateral environmental agreements provided by the Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network do not contain any minimum 
participation rule. In 81 cases, the participation rule asks for a minimum number 
of signatories. In 22 cases, unanimity is required for the treaty to come into 
force, namely all negotiating countries must sign and ratify the agreement for it 
to be effective. In the remaining 17 cases, the minimum participation rule is 
coupled with other requirements, i.e. for these agreements it is not sufficient for 
a certain number of countries to ratify the treaty, but these countries also have 
to satisfy other, additional criteria. 
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Proof of Lemma 1. 
Subtracting equations (12b) from (12a) yields: 
 
(16)  ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )**** 1 ANAA yKyyYP ψβδ −−=−′ , 
 
which implies that firms signing the VA produce a higher output if and 
only if they have lower marginal production costs.23 This is the case 
when ( )Kβδ −< 1 , or equivalently: 
 
(17)   β
δ
−> 1K  = K
°. 
 
Hence, only when the group of signatories is sufficiently large, 
can a signatory produce more than a non-signatory. In this case, a 
signatory also has a larger market share. Note that the positive 
relationship between profits and equilibrium output implies that (17) is a 
necessary condition for the (internal) stability condition (14a) to be 
met.24 Also note that (17) is more easily satisfied when the spillover rate 
β is low, and when the VA-related cost parameter δ  is also low.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
We show that for K ≥ K° the characteristics of the profits 
functions are such that once the critical participation threshold K^ is 
reached, in equilibrium K* = n firms join the VA.  
First note that a lower marginal cost is only a necessary 
condition for signatories to have larger profits than non-participants, 
because signatories also pay for the emission abatement costs φ(e). This 
implies that profits of signatories are larger than non-signatories only for 
a value of K above K°. Let us denote this value with K^ , where K^ ≥ K°. 
We now show that this value generally exists independently of whether 
                                                 
23 Note that *Ay  and 
*
NAy  are actually ( )KyA* and ( )KyNA* . While we take this into 
account in the following analysis, we omit reporting the K argument so as to 
simplify notation. 
24 This conclusion is true independently of φ because eq. (11) implies that 
equilibrium abatement is a monotonically non decreasing function of output. As 
a consequence, the greater the function φ(e), the lower y* and therefore the lower 
e* and the value of φ(e*). 
19 
 
profits increase monotonically with K for all K=1,2,…,n or not.  
Let us study the behaviour of the profit functions at the Nash 
equilibrium. In general, we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )****** ,,*,,******* ||,,, AANANAAAAANANAAA yeyyyyiij yeyyyyj
j
iAiii
KdK
dy
ydK
Keyyd
dK
d
ψψ
ππππ
===≠ ===
−
∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=≡ ∑
 
Hence, by totally differentiating (8a) at the Nash equilibrium and 
using symmetry, we get: 
 
(18a)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−+−= dK
YP
yyydyKndyKyYPd ANAANAAAA *'
*
******'* )1( ψπ . 
 
where the index i has been omitted because of symmetry. Let 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
≠
n
ij
j
A
A dydy
dR *  denote the aggregate industry reaction function and 
recall that RA is negative for the so-called generalized Hahn condition for 
a Cournot oligopoly (Dixit, 1986).  
Using (16) to substitute for ( )** NAA yy − , the previous equation 
becomes: 
 
(18b)  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−++= dK
YP
yKdyRyYPd AAAAA *'
*
***'* 11 ψβδπ . 
 
Similarly, by totally differentiating (8b), we obtain: 
 
(19a)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += dK
YP
yyydyKndy
YP
KKyYPd ANAANAANANA *'
*
****
*'
'
**'* 1 βψψβπ
 
By using (16) and the definition of RA, this becomes: 
 
(19b) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−++−++= dK
YP
yKdydydy
YP
KdyRyYPd ANAAAAANANA *'
*
***
*'
'
***'* 1 ψβδβψβπ
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Let us examine equations (18b) and (19b). First note that the 
terms within square brackets at the end of (18b) and (19b), respectively 
( )[ ]Kβδ −−+ 11  and ( )[ ]Kβδβ −−+ 1 , become negative for all 
K>K1= ( ) ( )βδ −+ 11  and K> ( ) ( )βδβ −+ 1  = K1 - 1 respectively, with   
K1–1>K°, for β < 1.25 Then observe that the relationship between profits 
and signatories in the two equations depends on 
dK
dyA
*
, the derivative of a 
signatory’s equilibrium production with respect to K.  
By assuming weakly convex demand functions, and defining 
with KA and KNA the coalition size for which the equilibrium production 
of signatories and non-signatories is maximised, we show in the 
Appendix that the following conditions hold: 
 
(20a)   0
*
≥
dK
dyiA  for K∈ [K°, KA]; 0
*
<
dK
dyiA  for K > KA, 
 with KA ≥ ( ) 2212
1
2
1Knn +=−
++ β
δ > K1; 
(20b)  KNA < KA  
(21a)   0** >− iNAiA dydy ,  for  K∈ [K°, n] and β < 1  
(21b)  0** <− iNAiA dydy ,  for  K∈ [1, n] and β=1; 
 
The first implication of these results is that both *Aπ  and *NAπ  may 
first increase and then decrease with K. Indeed, using (20) and (21) for studying 
(18b) and (19b) it can be verified that profits for signatories and non-
signatories certainly increase for K ≤ K1 and K ≤ K1 - 1, whereas they 
certainly decrease for K > KA, if the latter is smaller than n.26  
Moreover, conditions (20-21) allow us to compare (18b) and 
(19b) and draw the following conclusions concerning the shape of the 
profit functions, which in turn determine the behaviour of the stability 
                                                 
25 Hence, when considering ( )KA*π  and ( )1* −KNAπ , the last term within curly 
brackets in (18b) and (19b) has the same root K1 = ( ) ( )βδ −+ 11  
26 More precisely, K > KA is a sufficient condition to ensure decreasing profits in 
K. In fact, from (18b) and (19b) it can be easily seen that profits for signatories 
and non signatories could start to decrease even for some smaller Ks in the 
intervals [K1, KA] and [K°, KA] respectively. 
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function, finally showing that in equilibrium K* = n firms adopt the VA. 
For K ≥ K° and β < 1, i.e. in the interval of K in which K^ can exist, 
profits of non signatories start decreasing before profits of signatories. This can be 
seen by looking at the last term in (18b) and (19b), then noticing that ( ) 10 *'' <≤ YPKψβ  for the stability condition (1a) and the non 
decreasing relationship between output and abatement; finally that 
output of non signatories starts decreasing before signatories. The same 
condition is even more easily verified between ( )Kd A*π  and ( )1* −Kd NAπ , 
given that the last terms in (18b) and (19b) have the same root K1. 
In the interval [K^, n], any positive difference between ( )KA*π  and ( )KNA*π  
increases with K up to K=n. In fact, in the interval [K°, n], 
dK
d A
*π >
dK
d NA
*π . 
Comparing (18b) and (19b) this is readily seen when K ≤ KA i.e. the 
equilibrium production of signatories increases in K. For K> KA, the 
result is recovered by the presence of the positive term 
( ) ***'
'
1 NAA dydyYP
K −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +ψβ  within the curly brackets in (18b).  
 
Results i) and ii) jointly imply the existence of K^ as the internal 
stability condition ( )KA*π  ≥ ( )1* −KNAπ  is satisfied and L(K) are positive 
for all K ∈ [K^, n] for both a) the case where ( )KNA*π  increases with K (so that 
( )KNA*π  > ( )1* −KNAπ ) in a neighbourhood of K^ (see Figure 1); b) the case where  
( )KA*π  and ( )KNA*π   show opposite signs or decrease in K in a neighbourhood of K^ 
(see Figure 2). 
 
Case a). We know that ( )KNA*π  > for K < K°. However, for K ≥ K°, the 
positive difference between ( )Ad Kπ  and ( )NAd Kπ  (and ( )1NAd Kπ − ) 
allows for reversing the relationship between non signatories’ and 
signatories’ profits for some K. A fortiori, since ( )KNA*π  > ( )1* −KNAπ , we 
also have that ( )KA*π  ≥ ( )1* −KNAπ , i.e. K^ exists.27 Conclusion (ii) ensures 
that any positive difference between profits increases in [K^, n], hence 
L(K) is positive up to K=n. 
 
                                                 
27 Of course, as in the case of K°, whose value is ( )βδ −1 , there is no 
guarantee that K^ ≤ n. 
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Figure 1: Shape of functions πA(K) and πNA(K-1) for β < 1 when ( )KNA*π  
increases in K^ 
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K^ K*=n 0 K 
 
 
Case b). The fact that ( )KNA*π  and ( )1* −KNAπ  start decreasing before ( )KA*π  ensures that ( )1* −KNAπ  intercepts the profit function of signatories 
from above at K^, be it in the graphical example of Figure 2.a below or 
when both functions decrease in K (Figure 2.b). Then conclusion (ii) 
again ensures that L(K) is positive up to K=n. 
 
Hence, if K^<n, L(K) > 0 for K^<K≤ n, then there is an incentive 
to join the coalition for all K ∈ [K^, n]. The equilibrium coalition is thus 
the grand coalition (K* = n), whenever a co-ordination mechanism is 
introduced which induces at least K^ firms to sign the VA. The 
coordination mechanism could be a minimum participation constraint 
imposed by the regulator. (Cf. Carraro and Marchiori, 2003; Finus, 
2003). 
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Figure 2: Shape of functions π*A(K) and π*NA(K-1) for β < 1 when ( )1* −KNAπ  
decreases in K^ 
a)  
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Proof of Lemma 3:  
To show that the stability function L(K) is negative and 
negatively sloped when β = 1, first note that, from (16) and (17), when β 
= 1 it is clear that ** NAA yy ≤ , since K°= ∞. The fact that non-signatory 
firms always produce at least as much as signatory firms implies that 
( )KA*π  - ( )KNA*π  < 0 for all K ∈ [1, n]. 
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Then, from (21b), we have that 0** <− iNAiA dydy  for  K∈ [1, n], 
which implies that the inequality 
dK
d
dK
d NAA
** ππ <  always holds. Hence the 
negative difference ( )KAπ  - ( )KNAπ  always increases with K, which 
implies that the function ( )1−KNAπ  is greater than ( )KAπ  for all values 
of K, i.e. L(K) < 0 for all K ∈ [1, n], and that this difference increases in 
K, that is L’(K) < 0 for all K ∈ [1, n]. 
The negativity of the stability function in the whole support of K 
implies that no firm is willing to sign the VA, as previously stated in 
Proposition 1. As the cost effects of the VA are a pure public good, the 
incentive to free-ride is always greater than the benefits deriving from 
adhering thereto.  
How can we compare our results with those obtained by 
Dawson and Segerson (2008), who actually state that a stable group of 
firms will adopt a VA in equilibrium even when non signatories equally 
benefit from it? We argue that the difference between the two results is 
only apparent, and crucially determined by the absence or presence of an 
additional assumption on the coalition membership rule. In their paper, 
Dawson and Segerson actually argue that “a level of participation that is 
not profitable will lead to a dissolution of the coalition.” This would 
imply that each firm realizes that, for a PK such that the profitability 
condition (13) is barely satisfied,28 individual defection the would break 
the VA completely. Profits for non signatories would therefore be ( ) ( )01 ** NAPNA K ππ =− , and realizing this risk, firms belonging to a VA of 
size PK  would never defect. 
Such “farsighted” reasoning is often advocated, but it is not 
actually consistent with the assumption of the usual Nash conjectures in 
simultaneous oligopoly games. When the whole coalition collapses when 
one member defects, “coalition unanimity” (often known as “game Γ”) 
is assumed. Usually, the game-theoretic literature applies this rule to the 
whole support of K, and it is shown that with positive spillovers any 
K≥ PK  would be an equilibrium of the game (e.g. Bloch, 2003 for a 
survey). Only by assuming that the threat of the whole coalition 
                                                 
28 In the coalition theory jargon, PK can be referred to as the minimum profitable 
coalition size, which is the smallest coalition size for which a member obtains a 
higher payoff than if all firms are independent (e.g. Bloch, 2003). 
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collapsing is real just for K = PK , can one obtain the minimum 
participation threshold PK  which satisfies the profitability condition as 
the equilibrium of the game.29  
In fact, if we represent Dawson and Segerson’s (2008) analysis in 
our framework, setting β = 1 and assuming “local” coalition unanimity in 
the neighbourhood of PK ,30 we get the same result. 
 
Proposition 2. 
When firms’ strategies are such that “coalition unanimity rule” for VA membership 
is adopted at the minimum profitable participation level PK , a VA with PK  
participant firms is an equilibrium of the game for β = 1. For β < 1, K* = PK  is 
an equilibrium if PK is lower than K^, the minimum participation threshold for 
which signatories’ profits are larger than non-signatories'; K* = n otherwise. 
 
PROOF.  
For β = 1. The internal stability condition is satisfied since the VA 
becomes null and void if any firm pulls out of the agreement, i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )01 *** NAPNAPA KK πππ =−≥ . The external stability condition ( ) ( )PiNAPiA KK ππ ≤+1  is satisfied since from the proof of Lemma 3 we 
have ( )KA*π  - ( )KNA*π  < 0 and dKddKd NAA
** ππ <  for all K ∈ [1, n]. 
For β < 1. If PK < K^, this part of the proposition is satisfied 
using the above reasoning. If PK ≥ K^, non signatories are incentivised 
to join the VA, i.e. ( )1+PiA Kπ  ≥ ( )PiNA Kπ  for all K ∈ [K^, n]. As a 
consequence, the grand coalition K* = n is achieved in equilibrium. 
This ultimately confirms the generality and consistency of our 
model with the earlier literature. 
 
                                                 
29 Dissatisfaction with simultaneous coalition games has led to propose 
structures of “sequential games” of coalition formation. Considering the case of 
positive spillovers, the unique equilibrium in these games is actually PK , 
(Bloch, 2003). 
30 An additional assumption they make is the orthogonality of the reactions 
function of non-signers, which in our model is equivalent to setting 0
*
=
dK
d NAπ  
for K ∈ [1, n], K ≠ PK . 
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4 The design of VAs 
The characterisation of participation incentives described in the 
previous section has direct and important policy implications on the 
design of VAs in order to achieve full participation. Three 
recommendations follow from our results. First, the regulator should 
introduce a minimum participation constraint.  Namely the agreement 
only enters into force if at least a minimum number of firms belonging 
to the industry decides to adhere.  
Second, the regulator should design the VA in such a way that 
most of the benefits are reaped by signatories, thus minimising spillovers 
to non-signatories. This can be done, for example, through a policy-mix 
which penalises (or excludes from some benefits) firms which do not 
join the VA. Note that by minimising β, the regulator not only 
encourages firms to sign the VA, but also reduces the minimum 
participation constraint required to ensure that all firms adhere. 
A third important policy implication is drawn from the likely 
hump-shape of the profit functions, as shown in Figure 1. This shape is 
the result of the asymmetry produced by introducing the VA. Firms 
which sign the VA have a competitive advantage over other firms, 
because they enjoy lower marginal production costs (if β < 1 and when a 
stable coalition forms). This advantage implies a higher market share, 
and therefore higher profits, only if some firms are excluded from the 
VA. When all firms sign, they all enjoy the same expected reduction in 
costs and therefore have the same market share. Therefore, each firm 
desires to obtain the benefits provided by the VA, but not to share these 
benefits with all firms in the industry. Thus, firms are incentivised to 
form a coalition that is smaller than the one in which all firms 
participate.31 This is not possible under an open membership rule 
whereby firms are free to join or leave the VA, but it may be possible if 
an exclusive membership rule applies, where access is conditional on the 
consensus of the other signatories (Cf. Yi, 1997; Carraro and Marchiori, 
2003). Consequently, if the regulator’s objective is to achieve the greatest 
environmental benefit, he/she should design the VA in such a way that 
firms are unable to adopt rules or behaviours that enable them to 
                                                 
31 Examples exist in which the EC Directorate-General Competition has made 
inapplicable the provision of a VA which restricted some advantages only to 
original members. E.g., see Gremminger, Laurila and Miersch (2001) on the Eco-
Emballages waste recovering system. 
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exclude other firms therefrom.32  
All the above mentioned policy design directions can be 
summarised in the following proposition, which directly follows from 
the analysis carried out in the previous section 
 
Proposition 3.  
If the regulator wants to ensure that all firms adopt the VA, then: a) benefits for 
signatory firms must be partially excludable, b) an adequately defined minimum 
participation constraint K ≥ K^ must be imposed, c) an open membership rule must 
be enforced for the VA.  
4. 1. Welfare enhancing mandatory abatement constraints 
So far, we have only stressed that if VAs are properly designed, 
they will be signed by all firms in the industry even if some free-riding 
may occur. However, their effectiveness in terms of environmental 
control remains uncertain, given that the profit maximising abatement 
level set by signatory firms may be too low compared to the level of the 
environmental externality. This raises the question of whether a policy 
mix that incorporates a minimum abatement constraint associated with 
the possibility of firms having access to a VA scheme, can not only 
enhance the VA environmental effectiveness, but also improve welfare: 
From a pessimistic viewpoint, one may argue that since a 
minimum abatement constraint increases the abatement effort required 
by firms, it will also reduce their output and profits and could raise 
equilibrium prices, thus resulting in an overall reduction in welfare (recall 
that welfare is defined as the sum of industry profits, consumer surplus 
and environmental benefits). Hence, a minimum abatement level may 
not be welfare improving.  
From an optimistic viewpoint, i) either environmental benefits 
may outweigh profits and consumer surplus losses from price increase 
(in the literature on voluntary overcompliance, this is the case for models 
with vertically differentiated firms; e.g. Arora and Gangopadyay, 1995; 
and Lutz et al, 2000); ii) or the introduction of an additional bias may 
force firms to “pursue their own interests” by diverting them from 
adopting a Cournot-Nash behaviour in the choice of voluntary 
                                                 
32 The case is more ambiguous if the regulator aims to maximise total welfare, 
since the greater environmental benefit achieved when all firms participate in 
the VA and the higher consumer surplus resulting from price reductions, must 
be measured against the lower total profit in the industry. 
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abatement levels. 
The existence and the size of the latter ‘second best argument’ 
can be analysed by solving the regulator’s decision problem in the first 
stage of our policy framework. As previously explained, the regulator 
chooses between a VA in which firms are free to set their profit 
maximising abatement level and a VA in which a minimum abatement 
level is imposed. The regulator decides to impose a minimum abatement 
requirement only if: (i) the profit maximising abatement level is below 
the minimum abatement standard; and (ii) total welfare increases in the 
presence of a minimum abatement level. 
In order to see whether the second condition can be met, let us 
analyse a firm’s choice in the third stage of the game when the VA 
requires the achievement of a minimum abatement level Ae . If Ae  < 
*
Ae , 
then the equilibrium is the one previously derived. Vice versa, if Ae  ≥ *Ae , 
then a firm only chooses output in the third stage of the game, and the 
equilibrium is defined by the standard Cournot output choices. Indeed, if 
emissions by the VA adopting firms are equal to Ae , the profit functions 
become:  
 
(22a)  ( ) ( ) ( )AAAAAA eyeKecyYP φδπ −−+−=   
(22b)  ( ) ( ) NAANANA yeKcyYP βπ −−= .                      
 
The equilibrium first order conditions are therefore: 
 
(23a)  ( ) ( ) ( ) AA eKcYPyYP −+=+′ δ***  
(23b)  ( ) ( ) ANA eKcYPyYP β−=+′ *** ,  
 
where the upper bar denotes the equilibrium values when a minimum 
abatement constraint exists. 
Similarly to the unconstrained case, the previous equilibrium 
conditions are a pre-requisite for solving the second stage of the game, in 
which firms decide whether or not to sign the VA proposed by the 
regulator. In order to determine K* - the Nash equilibrium number of 
firms which join the VA - we must compare profits of signatory and 
non-signatory firms. The results for the equilibrium coalition are 
essentially identical to those summarised by Proposition 1, given that the 
equilibrium conditions (23a) and (23b) are analogous to conditions (9a) 
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and (9c) when no abatement constraints exist. Hence, the presence of a 
minimum abatement level does not modify the shape of the profit 
functions of signatories and free-riders. Therefore, in equilibrium, K*= n. 
This finally allows us to move on to the first stage of the game, 
by comparing outputs and profits in the presence and absence of an 
abatement constraint and by checking whether an interval exists in which 
welfare is an increasing function of the level of mandatory abatement. 
With the minimum abatement constraint output is clearly higher since it 
is a decreasing function of marginal costs, which are lower under a 
binding minimum constraint.  
As for profits, note that they are identical in the two cases when 
Ae = *Ae . Moreover, profits for signatory firms in the unconstrained 
regime are maximised when eA = *Ae ; thus to compare profits, we just 
need to evaluate the derivative 
A
A
ed
dπ  at Ae = *Ae . By differentiating (22a) 
at the Nash equilibrium with respect to Ae  and using the envelope 
theorem (so that 0
*
* =∂
∂
A
iA
iA
iA
ed
yd
y
π ) we have: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] AAANAAAiA edeyKydKnydKyPd '1 ****' φδπ −−+−+−= . 
 
Again using the generalised reaction function ( iAR ), this yields 
 
(24)  ( ) ( )AA
A
A
iAA
A
iA eyK
ed
dyRyP
ed
d '*
*
*' φδπ −−+= . 
 
At the equilibrium of the second stage of the game, i.e. K* = n, 
we have: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] AAAAAiA edeynydnyPd '1 ***' φδπ −−+−= , 
 
from which: 
 
(25)  ( ) ( )AA
A
An
AA
A
iA eyn
ed
dyRyP
ed
d '*
*
*' φδπ −−+= , 
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where nAR  is the ‘standard’ negative generalised reaction function of a 
symmetric Cournot oligopoly, and AA eddy*  is clearly positive as can be 
seen from (23a). 
Hence, if the minimum standard is imposed when the grand 
coalition is the equilibrium coalition, profits of signatories may increase 
provided that: 
 
(26)  ( ) ( )
A
An
AAAA ed
dyRyPyne
*
*'*' +−< δφ . 
 
It can easily be verified that introducing a minimum abatement 
requirement when K < n does not change the quality of the result.33 
Hence, equation (26) identifies an interval in which profits may be an 
increasing function of the minimum mandatory abatement level. The size 
of this interval depends on the coalition size, equilibrium output (which 
is affected by the set of demand and supply parameters considered) and 
the magnitude of marginal abatement costs, which in turn are 
determined by the extent of minimum abatement constraint due to 
convexity.  
The implications of equations (25) and (26) are summarised in 
the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 4: 
 If a coalitional VA forms, social welfare can be increased by introducing a minimum 
binding abatement constraint. In particular, for sufficiently low marginal abatement 
costs, there is an interval of abatement levels for which all components of the welfare 
function, including profits, increase when a minimum abatement constraint 
characterises the VA. 
 
PROOF.  
If there is an appropriate minimum binding abatement constraint, i.e. 
(26) is met, then: 
(i) environmental benefits are greater, because total abatement 
is greater than it would be were firms free to set their own 
abatement levels. 
                                                 
33 Simply look at equation (24) to see that a positive interval also exists when K 
< n. 
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(ii) consumer surplus is higher, given that the greater reduction 
in costs when an emission abatement constraint is in force 
entails a higher level of production.  
(iii) firms’ profits are higher, since the regulator will choose a 
minimum abatement level which satisfies condition (26). 
 
The reason behind the fact that a mandatory abatement is 
required in order to increase production (and possibly profits) is to be 
found in the positive participation externality that the VA brings to the 
industry. This is related to the number of participating firms and to the 
total extent of their effort. When this external effect is present34 and 
when a firm decides its abatement effort, it also takes into account the 
effect that its choice will have on the marginal costs of its competitors. 
In particular, it realises that its decision to abate emissions will also 
benefit its competitors. This obviously diminishes the firm’s propensity 
to abate emissions.  
The Cournot-Nash competition scheme will consequently lead 
to an under-provision of abatement efforts -- as is usually the case when 
a positive externality is present -- because firms take the abatement 
choice of other members of the VA as given, instead of coordinating 
their abatement strategies. A minimum abatement constraint is simply a 
way of persuading firms to produce this external effect, moving them 
closer to co-operative abatement levels. In this case, although abatement 
costs increase, there may be an interval of emission abatement levels in 
which the cost increase is dominated by the higher revenue generated by 
higher production, which yields higher profits. Not surprisingly, the 
models which have unveiled this sort of effects for emission taxation 
(e.g. Dung, 1993; Carraro and Soubeyrain, 1996) and quality standards 
(e.g. Farzin, 2003) are developed in an oligopolistic framework and in the 
presence of free-riding incentives. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper was to identify the conditions 
under which a group of firms in a given industry consider signing a VA 
the best option even when there are incentives to free-ride. These 
incentives arise from the non-excludability of the benefits achieved by 
firms adhering to the VA. Non-signatories may indeed gain all or part of 
                                                 
34 Note that this effect is analogous to the ‘competitive-advantage externality’ in 
the RJV literature (Kamien et al., 1992). 
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these benefits as well. What conditions encourage a firm’s to participate 
in a VA is a crucial consideration to make for the proper design of VAs 
in an oligopolistic framework.  
We have seen that the equilibrium of the game, which describes 
the interaction between regulators and firms and among all firms in the 
industry, is characterised by several strategic incentives and external 
effects. The first externality is that produced by the (partial or total) 
public good nature of the VA. This is the origin of the afore mentioned 
free-riding incentives. A second strategic incentive arises from the fact 
that the cost saving effectiveness of the VA may increase with the 
number of firms adhering thereto and the extent of their abatement. 
Finally, a third strategic incentive is created by the oligopolistic nature of 
the market, which leads firms to overproduce compared to the case 
where they would jointly maximise industry profits and also not perfectly 
co-ordinate their voluntary initiatives on emission abatement. 
The first effects may suggest that a VA is unlikely to be signed 
or, if it is signed, only a small number of firms will agree to adhere (Cf. 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994). However, the second effect 
may offset the first effect, because firms know that the greater the 
number of signatories, the greater the benefits to be gained. We have 
shown that, under certain conditions concerning the extent of the 
spillover effect, the second effect can prevail, in particular when a 
minimum participation constraint is met. The third effect explains why a 
cut in production and/or increase of abatement levels produced by the 
VA may increase welfare and even industry profits. 
From a positive viewpoint, by analysing the coalitional game in 
which firms decide whether or not to participate in the VA and taking 
into account the interplay of the abovementioned three strategic 
incentives, we have shown that: 
- If the benefits that firms achieve from adhering to the VA 
are non excludable, i.e. non-signatories get the same benefits 
as signatory firms, then no firms decide to sign the VA at 
the equilibrium. 
- If the benefits are partially excludable, i.e. signatories get 
more benefits that non signatories, then a VA is signed only 
if an appropriate minimum participation constraint is 
satisfied. Hence, this could be opportunely imposed by the 
regulator. 
- However, if benefits are partially excludable, firms signing 
the VA may find it optimal to exclude other firms from 
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participating in the VA, because of the strategic advantage 
that a VA provides to signatories in an oligopolistic market 
(as seen in Section 3, a VA produces both absolute and 
relative cost advantages). 
- Finally, the optimal voluntary abatement effort produced by 
the firms in the VA may be smaller than the socially optimal 
one, i.e. signatory firms still tend to over-emit if they are not 
constrained by a minimum abatement requirement. 
 
In the light of the above results, we can make some normative 
policy recommendations or provide some suggestions on how to 
optimally design a VA in an oligopolistic industry. First, the regulator 
should design the VA such that mainly the signatory firms reap the 
related benefits (in terms of regulatory pre-emption, technological co-
operation, financial and technical incentives, etc.). Free-riders should be 
at least partly excluded from these benefits (e.g. they are taxed whereas 
signatories are not; they do not receive the financial incentives, the 
additional flexibility or the public recognition granted to participants).  
Second, the VA should contain a minimum participation clause, 
namely it comes into force only if a minimum number of firms accepts 
to adhere thereto. This minimum participation constraint reduces free-
riding incentives (Cf. Carraro, Marchiori and Oreffice, 2009) and enables 
firms to achieve a level of benefits that creates a band-wagon effect, i.e. 
when the minimum number of signatories is achieved, all remaining 
firms find it optimal to sign the VA as well. Note that the greater the 
share of benefits reaped by the signatories, the lower the minimum 
participation constraint will be. 
Third, the VA may oblige signatory firms to achieve at least a 
minimum individual mandatory abatement level. This can prove useful 
both for avoiding negligible emission reductions, and for partly 
offsetting the negative effects on production and profits of non-
cooperative (oligopoly-specific) behaviour regarding abatement levels. 
Finally, the regulator may decide to guarantee open access to the 
VA in order to exclude an anti-competitive, discriminatory use of the VA 
by some firms in the industry.  
In light of the previous considerations, one can see that an 
optimal VA design is actually a policy mix design, that is an 
environmental policy where the co-existence of voluntary and 
‘traditional’ (whether ‘command and control’ or ‘economic’) elements 
should be foreseen. From this viewpoint, some of the negative 
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reputation accumulated by voluntary agreements can probably be 
attributed to past implementations characterized by a naïve trust in a 
merely self-enforcing kind of mechanism, rather than to the intrinsic 
unsuitability of this policy tool for implementing environmental 
regulation policies.  
Further research could explore the issue of the optimal design of 
VAs in different contexts still characterized by intra-industry spillovers. 
For example, it would be interesting to analyse the case of ‘green 
reputation enhancing’ VAs, i.e. where the VA is adopted by firms 
because of its positive effects on market demand. Or to analyse cases in 
which signatories cooperate on abatement and/or collude on production 
levels. Finally, our analysis is based on the assumption of symmetric 
firms. The adoption of VAs in an industry with asymmetric firms (e.g. 
with different efficiency levels) could also be a topic of interest.  
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Appendix  
 
i. Proof of inequalities (20a) 
Let us first introduce the following notation to identify the well-known 
negative expressions which define the second order conditions of the 
profit maximisation problem in a Cournot oligopoly: 
 
 ( ) '*''' ψδ−++≡ KyPPa iAiA , 
 *''' iAiA yPPb +≡ , 
 *''' iNAiNA yPPa +≡ ,  
 '*''' ψβKyPPb iNAiNA ++≡  
 
By focussing on weakly convex demand functions, we also have 
( ) 0'' ≥YP . 
 
Total differentiation of (12a) and (12b) yields: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) dKdybKndyaKdyPa iAKNAiAiAiAiAiA µ−=−+−++ − ***' 1 , ( ) ( ) dKdyKbdyaKndyPa iNAKAiNANAiNANAiNA µ−=+−−++ − ***' 1 ; 
 
where symmetry has been exploited to add terms which are equal at the 
equilibrium. These equations can be re-written as: 
 
(A.1)  ( ) ( ) dKdybKndyPKa iAKNAiAAiA µ−=−++ **'  
(A.2)  ( )( ) dKdyKbdyPaKn iNAKAiNANAiNA µ−=++− **' , 
 
where iAKµ  and iNAKµ  are the direct effects of a variation of K on the first 
order conditions (12a) and (12b): 
 
 
( )( )
( ) ψ
ψπµ
+−=
+−+=∂∂
∂≡
**
***'''
2
                     NAAiA
NAAiA
iA
iAiA
K
yyb
yyyPP
Ky , 
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( )( )
( ) βψ
βψπµ
+−=
+−+=∂∂
∂≡
**
***'''
2
                         NAAiNA
NAAiNA
iNA
iNAiNA
K
yya
yyyPP
Ky   
 
By applying Cramer’s rule to (A.1) and (A.2) we have: 
 
 (A.3)  
( )
( )
( )
( ) '
'
'*
PaKnKb
bKnPKa
PaKn
bKn
dK
dy
iNAiNA
iAiA
iNA
iNA
K
iA
iA
K
A
+−
−+
+−−
−−
= µ
µ
, 
 
(A.4)  ( )
( ) '
'
'
*
PaKnKb
bKnPKa
Kb
PKa
dK
dy
iNAiNA
iAiA
iNA
KiNA
iA
KiA
NA
+−
−+
−
−+
= µ
µ
. 
 
Since the determinant of the denominator (denoted by DET) is positive 
(this is implied by the second order conditions for profit maximisation), 
the sign of (A.3) and (A.4) is determined by their numerators. In 
particular, we have: 
 
(A.5a) ( )( )[ ]'* 1 PbaKn
DETdK
dy iA
KiA
iNA
KiNA
iA
K
iA µµµ +−−−= . 
 
Using (16) to substitute for y*A - y*NA , we get: 
 
(A.5b) ( )( ) ( )[ ][ ]KbbaKnP
DETdK
dy
iAiAiNA
iA βδβψ −−+−−+−= 1'
*
, 
 
which is clearly positive in a generic interval [K°, KA]. For a weakly 
convex demand function, the lowest KA value is obtained for a linear 
demand function. In this case, we get: 
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(A.5c)  ( ) ( )[ ]Kn
DET
P
dK
dyA βδβψ −−++−−= 1211
'*
, 
 
which is positive for  ( ) 2212
1
2
1KnnK +=−
++< β
δ . 
 
Hence 0
*
≥
dK
dyiA  for  K∈ [K°, KA], where KA > K° in general and           
KA ≥ ( ) 2212
1
2
1Knn +=−
++ β
δ > K1 for weakly convex demand functions. 
 
      Q.E.D. 
 
 
ii. Proof of inequalities (20b and 21) 
 
From (A.4), 
dK
dyiNA
*
 is defined by the following equation: 
 
(A.6a) ( )[ ]'* 1 PbaK
DETdK
dy iNA
KiNA
iA
KiA
iNA
K
iNA µµµ +−−= ; 
 
that is, recalling that 'ψβKab iNAiNA += , 
 
(A.6b) ( )[ ]''* 1 PKaaK
DETdK
dy iNA
K
iA
KiNA
iA
KiA
iNA
K
iNA µψβµµµ +−−−= . 
 
Subtracting (A.6b) from (A.5a) it follows that: 
 
(A.7a)  
( )( )( ) ( )⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−+
+−−−=−
iA
iNA
KiNA
iA
K
iNA
K
iA
K
iAiA
iNA
K
iA
KiNAiA
banP
baKK
DETdK
dy
dK
dy
µµµµ
µψβµ
'
'** 1  
 
To find the sign of this difference, re-write n as n + (n-K) and use again 
'ψβKab iNAiNA += . Then:  
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(A.7b)   
( )( ) ( )( )⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−+−+
+−−=−
iAiNA
iNA
K
iA
K
iA
iNA
KiNA
iA
KiNAiA
baKnP
abK
DETdK
dy
dK
dy
βψµµ
µµ
'
** 1  
 
The three terms within square brackets are all negative for K>K° and β < 
1. This can be seen more easily by expanding (A.7b) as follows:  
 
(A.7c) ( )( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−+−+
+−+−−−=−
iAiNA
iNA
K
iA
K
iAiNAiAiNAiAiNANAAiNAiA
baKnP
abaabbyyK
DETdK
dy
dK
dy
βψµµ
βψ
'
**** 1  
 
Hence: 
a)  0
**
>−
dK
dy
dK
dy iNAiA  for  K∈ [K°, n];  
b) As a corollary, given that 0
*
≥
dK
dyiA  for K∈ [K°, KA], the 
equilibrium output for non-signatories starts decreasing for a value of K 
such that KNA <K<KA in the interval [K°, n]. 
 
When β = 1, equation (A.7.c) becomes: 
 
(A.8a) ( )( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−−−+
+−+−−−=−
**'
**** 1
NAAiAiNA
iAiNAiAiNAiAiNANAAiNAiA
yyPKnba
abaabbyyK
DETdK
dy
dK
dy
ψ
ψ  
 
That is, by using (16): 
 
(A.8b) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−=− δδψ Knbaabaabb
P
K
DETdK
dy
dK
dy
iAiNAiAiNAiAiNAiAiNA
iNAiA
'
**
 
It can easily be verified that the two terms within curly brackets are 
positive, so that, for β = 1: 
 
  0
**
<−
dK
dy
dK
dy iNAiA .   
      Q.E.D
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